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DISSENT OF COl'1MISSIONER J. CLAY S1'1ITH, JR. 
RE: VOTE OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYHENT OPPORTUNITY COM}!ISSION 
ON THE ISSUES OF CONTRIBUTION UNDER TITLE VII 
AND THE EQUAL PAY ACT ON JULY 1, 1980 
.. 
The view$' of the members of the EEOC were requested on the , 
t 
above captioned issues by the Department of Justice. Justice 
will represent the interest of the U.S. Government in a matter 
before the Supreme Court raising the contribution issues. 
On July 1, 1980, the General Counsel brought two major 
issues before the Commission for consideration and approval. 
In broad terms, the first issue presented was whether as a 
matter of policy the EEOC opposes the right of an employer to 
'. 
sue a union for contribution where both parties' joint conduct may 
:. 
result in a violat~n of Title VII. The second issue 
presented the same question as it relates to violations of the 
Equal Pay Act. On the first issue the majority voted not to 
support'a policy of contribution (with Commissioners Smith and 
Walsh dissenting). On the second issue the majority voted not 
to support ~ policy of contribution (with Commissioner Smith, 
~ .:,. 
alone, dissenting). Because of the importance of these questions, 
I submit my views for the official min·utes for association with 
my dissents and to be associated with any communications 
supported by the majority transmitted to the Department of 
Justice, or elsewhere. 
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BACKGROUND 
Two years ago the Commission approved the General 
Counsel advancing the position that a party found guilty of 
! 
violating Title VIr had a right to contribution against any 
other party who participated in the wrong-doing. The 
Connnissi€>n took this position in an amicus· curIae brief in 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transpor·tation Workers· Union of 
America, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Citing prominent 
authority, the EEOC's brief stated: 
"/G/eneral principles of justice require 
. 
' .• 
that in the case of a common obligation, 
the discharge of it by one of the obligors 
without proportionate payment from the 
other, gives the latter an advant~ge to which 
he is not equitably entitled." (Commission 
brief at p. 20) 
Nothing has changed in law or in fact which warrants the 
Commission reversing this original position. Indeed, our 
position is stronger now than when the Commission first endorsed 
the principle of contribution since the only two "Courts of 
Appeals which have considered the issue have both ruled that 
Title VII defendants have a right to contribution fro~ other 
parties responsible for the discrimination. See· No"rthwest 
Air1ine·s , Inc. v. Transportation Workers Un'i"ono"f AIne·rica 1 
606 F. 2d 1350 (D. C. Cir. 1979) and G1us v.· Murphy, F.2d 
_ .. _~~_, CJ,rd Cir.) (No. 79-1507, 1508), decided June 27, 1980. 
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Both Courts of Appeals held that contribution furthers 
the mission of Title VII in eliminating invidious employment 
"-
discrimination!' The Title VII statutory scheme and EEOC 
, 
implementing regulations were designed with the expectation that 
if a union jointly participates in an unlawful employment practice 
it would·be held monetarily liable. See EEOC Compliance Manual, 
Sec. 201.5 (b) (Employers as aggr.ieved persons). 
In the GIlls decision, supra, Judge A. Leon Higginbotham 
pointed out that the very terms of Title VII establish that 
unions are .to be held financially liable with employers for 
'. 
unlawful.~cts. As his opinion points out, while Section 703(a) 
of Title VII, 42 U.S-.C. 2000e-2(c)(3) holds a union liable 
not only for discriminatory actions in which it independently 
engages but also when it "causelsl or attempt/s/to cause an 
employer to discriminate against an individual . . " 
backpay provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) is 
applicable :to unions and employers alike. 
Judge Higginbotham opined: 
. ~. 
"These provisions reflect a statutory policy 
that the responsibility for monetary relief 
should be borne by both unions and employers 
to the extent that they are responsible for 
violations of Title VII. A r~ght of cont~i­
butio!'} 'vould achieve this' goal. (emphasis 
added) I~ contrast, a holding that there is 
no ri£ht of contribution under Title VII 
~ . 
The 
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would release some individuals from 
liability." Glus v. Murphy, 's'upra at 
-t 't;~ 
p. 14, slip opinion. 
In addition to this language, Judge Higginbotham provided 
five ,oth~r in,dep.enderit anG: iI:!p'ortant p:61i'cy' consi,detatiQns ' 
supporting the majority opinion of the court which are too 
persuasive for me to cast my lot with the majority of the 
Comrndssion on the Title VII issue: 
'. 
1. :. Po li'cy : Joint Elimination 'o'f Dis'crimitia't'i'on. Quoting 
Albermarle Paper Co: v. Hoody, 422 U. s. 405, 417-418 (1975), 
Judge Higginbotham stated, 
It is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay 
f 'award that "provide/s/ the spur or catalyst which 
causes employers and-unions to self-examine and to 
self-evaluate their employment practice and to 
endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last 
vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominous page 
~n this country's history." Id. at 15 (slip opinion). 
2. Policy: Vigilance During Collective Bargain'ing. 
Judge Higginbotham stated, 
Under a rule of contribution "/b/oth union and 
employer will knov7 that they both must be vigilant 
to es chevl un lavlful dis crimina tion and that the 
employee's ?redilections as to whom to sue will n'ot 
insure either immunity froQ the mandates of the 
la~v. If Ibid.. (emphasis added) 
3. Policy: Contribution Favors Conciliation\ Judge 
~. 
HigginbothaT:l stated, 
A right of contribution would also serve the Title VII 
policy of favoring conciliation and settlement of 
these claims. II/f/ooperation and voluntary compliance 
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/a/re the preferred means for achieving" the goal 
or equality of employment opportunities. Ibid. 
4. Poliiy:' Prevents Unjust Enrichment. Judge Higginbotham 
stated, 
.. , 
Further, t~e con~ribution :u1e prevents a plaintiff 
fro~ ~ecom7~g unjustly enr1ched either by collusive 
~ ~ct1V1ty w1th one of the defendants, or bv threaten-
1ng.one ~efendant that the suit will be brought only 
aga1nst 1t, thereby forcing an unjustified settlement. 
Id. at 16. 
5. Policy: Contribution is Consistent with Congressional 
Tntent. Judge Higginbotham stated, 
A·~right of contribution would implement the congressional 
intent to hold both unions and employers liable for 
:. unlawful employment practice and would aid the concilia-
tion and settlement goals of Title, VIr. ' Ihid. 
Historically, the Commission has successfully argued in 
the Appellate Courts that ,the 'hackpay provi.sion' ,of: Title VII 
is prophylactic. See A1bermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405 (1975). By that I mean backpay is a preventative tool. 
When an employer or union becomes aware that other institutions 
are making backpay awards for violations of anti-discrimination 
statutes, these persons have notice that if they violate the law, 
they too are reasonably certain to be subject to monetary 
liability. Under contribution, unions as well as employers 
recognize that they have [0 active!y work to eliminate discrimination 
because even if no charge is filed against it, a party to a 
collecti'le bargaining agreement car: still seel~ contribution from 
the other for past violations of la~:. ~bsent contribution, if 
a uni0B: is not charged because of l;ick 0:-' kno\7ledge, inadvertence 
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or design, the union may enjoy irrmunity. 
The Commission majority reasoned, inter alia, that 
contribution ls inconsistent with the fact that some unions 
! 
" 
, 
may aid the Commission in proving employer violations. 
Implicit in the majority's argument is the assUI!lption that 
unions aid charging parties and the Connnission in eliminating 
discrimination. However, as the history of Title VII reveals, 
the majority of unions have not been in the vanguard'in fighting 
discrimination. See, United Steelworkers of America v. v!eber, 
443 u.s. 36 (1979), which tolls against the position taken by the 
maj ori ty . The .opening .text of the' vJe.b'er op inion 
(which the EEOC applauded) st'ate:s ;-that ,l!btacks' ··/Fi.av~l lo~g been 
excluded from craft unions l / . . . " Footnote 1 is revealing: 
1/ Judicial findings of exclusion from crafts on 'racial 
grounds are so numerous as to make such exclusion a 
proper subject for judicial notice. See, e.g., United 
States v. International Union of Elevator 'Contractors, 
538 F.2d 1012, (CA3 1976); Associated General Contractors 
of 1'1assachusetts v. Alshuler, 490 F. 2d 9 (CAl 1973); 
Southern Illinois Builders Association v. Ogilve, 471 
F.2d 680, (CA7 1972); Contractors Association of Eas'tern 
Pennsylvania v. Secret'ary 'of Labor, 442 F. 2d 159, 
(CA3 1971); Local 53 'of International Ass'oci"a:tion 'of Heat 
& Frost, etc. v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, (CAS 1969); 
Buckner v. Goodyear, 339 F.Supp. 1108, (ND, Ala. 1972), 
aff'd without opinion, 475 F.2d 1287, (CAS 1973). See 
~j' also, United States Commission on Civil Rights, The 
Challenge Ahead: ~Qllal Opportunity in Referral Unions 
-" , .... 
..... 
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58-94 (1976), (summarizi~g judicial findings of 
discrimination by craft unions); G. :r1yrda1, An 
Americ"aIi fnilennna (1944) 1079-1124; R. Marshall and 
~ " 
1 
V. Briggs, The Negro and Appren"ticeship (1967); 
S. Spero and A. Harris, The" Bl"a"ck" Wo"rker (1931); 
Un~ted States Commission on Civil Rights, Employment 
97 (1961). State Advisory Committee, United States 
Commission on Civil Rights, 50 States Report 209 
(1961); Marshall, "The N~gro in Southern Unions," 
in The Negr"o ahd the" ADler"ic"an Lab"or Movement (ed. 
Jacob~~n, ~..nchor 1968) p. 145; App \ 63, 104." 
:. 
See also, R. C. WeaV'er, Negro Lahor (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 
N. Y., 1946); No~gren, vlebster, et a1., "EmF"loy-ing The Ne"g"r"o" "In 
American Industry (Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., N.Y., 
1959) (Mono. No. 17); Van Deusen, The Black Man in ~1hite 
America (The Associated Pub., Inc. 1938) (with particular 
reference to Chaps. V and VI). 
The fact of the matter is that there are some unions 
which are good on equal employment opportunity issues and some 
which are bad. Norgren, Webster, Employing The" Negro In 
Americ"an Industry, supra at 145; Harshall & Briggs, The Negro 
and Apprenticeshj:.J?.: ci ted in Un1ted Steel~'7orkers of America 
v. Weber, supra 35: n.l. Simple justice demands, the principles 
of equity cr:,' 01.1i.:. and the bad~"eR of his tory urge thet no party 
to a collective tar-gaining ag;~eement vibich viola";~e.3 the law 
should be pl~ced in a preferred status as a l:"::=tt"L t.~-:". (."if administrative 
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discretion, equity or distributive justice 'in: ,connection with 
the contribution issue. As applied to unions, t~at is what both 
1 . 
UIii,ted Stai:es:~o'urts: :0 f.' Appe"als" :wliich nave: :consi:'oe~ed' ,the' ,is:sue 'have 
, 
ruled; that was the Commission's and the General Counsel's 
original position; and that is what makes the most sense in the 
fair and~effective enforcement of Title VII and other anti-
discrimination statutes. Any other result impedes justice and 
rewards the most discriminatory and recalcitrant unions which 
for one reason or another have not been sued by the charging,; 
party. Ci~il Rights policy consideratio~s weigh heavily in 
... 
favor of :.the principle of contribution. Accordingly, I resp,ectfully, 
diss'ent, fr'om' the maJori,ty t s .. pos,ition' .to" ":restrict ,~he right'. * / 
cc: The Commissioners 
General Counsel 
Executive Secretariat 
J. Clay Smith, Jr. 
Commissioner 
July 7, 1980 
'k/ 
- Based upon principles of equity, the view, 'exp'.res·sed above 'is, 
the reason why I dissented on the contribution issue as it 
relates to the Equal Pay Act, It is within the general 
equitable powers of the Federal courts to impose joint and 
several liability on a union or employer for violation of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act. 
